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SUMMARY 
 
Various academics have pointed out that the aim of EU competition laws was initially 
to preserve individual economic freedoms and access to the market. Pursuant to their 
standpoint, if individuals’ economic freedoms are maximized, it means that there is a 
liberal market economy with a fierce competition, to which we ought to be grateful for 
our relatively successful economies. However, it appears from the recent case law of 
CJEU, guidelines enforced by the European Commission and legislation passed within 
the recent years that the EU’s attitude, as well as the member states’, has shifted over 
time and the main priority now is claimed to be consumer welfare. Protecting the 
consumer welfare, however, means prohibiting economic entities’ freedoms to take 
actions that hinder competition in any way that may result in raised prices.  
  
Bearing that in mind, the author asks whether this changed perspective has run 
contrary to liberal market economy principles, which the Union founders had in mind. 
The analysis is made on the example of vertical agreements and the restrictions 
stipulated therein, which are regulated in various forms by the EU’s institutions. In 
order to answer the question set forth above, the author has taken an economic law 
approach, which examines this particular political agenda in an economic context. This 
approach was chosen because it is the only way to understand the right justifications 
for regulating competition between economic entities.  
 
Free market economy is an economic system where the demand and supply dictate 
production. It is a system, which operates independently and where the government 
does not intervene. As a rule of thumb, the latter intervenes only to preserve economic 
freedom valid at the market. This system ideally brings prosperity to sovereign 
economies; however, it also has several flaws, which make the government 
intervention necessary at some point. For example, some agreements concluded by 
companies may obstruct competition and may eventually lead to a monopoly or 
otherwise decreased economic progress. History has shown that the intensity of 
governments’ intervention into economy has changed over time with the help of 
various schools of competition policy theories. However, it has turned out that those 
tendencies have been more or less taken place simultaneously in the US and EU, 
whereas now arriving in a more liberal stadium compared to the 1960ties, for example. 
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That allows to reason that the attitude towards vertical restrictions is perhaps 
liberalized too.  
 
In distribution agreements one could often find clauses that, inter alia, stipulate an 
exclusive right to distribute the suppliers’ products in a particular area or dictate to the 
distributor the prices the latter use when selling the supplier’s products. An Agent and 
a principal may want, for example, to agree that the agent will not actively approach 
certain groups of customers or prohibit the agent to sell products that compete with the 
principal’s products. On the other hand, in franchise agreements the franchisee usually 
promises to buy certain quantity of products from the franchisor. All these and many 
other restrictions may be blended between different forms of agreements. 
 
Vertical agreements are not seen as having as bad an effect on competition and 
common market as horizontal agreements, due to the fact these are not generally made 
between competitors. However, there are also various restrictions in vertical 
agreements that are seen as unlawful by EU competition authorities. The Commission 
has specified application of the Article 101 TFEU that prohibits uncompetitive 
agreements in secondary legislation (for instance, guidelines, recommendations). De 
minimis Notice states that restrictive agreements, which are made between financially 
insignificant companies, are generally excused from these restrictions imposed by the 
public authorities. Somewhat bigger companies, on the other hand, may find safe 
harbor in the block exemption Regulation that exempts agreements by categories. For 
instance, if the market share of a company is smaller than 30% of the relevant market, 
then the Commission generally will not intervene in its affairs. In Vertical Guidelines, 
the Commission explains in detail the restrictions and agreements that are and are not 
excused. In general, it provides that if provisions play a part in creating restrictive 
effects on entering into market and trade between Member States, they may infringe 
Article 101 TFEU.  
 
The EU case law shows that both the Courts and the Commission are increasingly 
considering economic and legal context when making their decisions. This emphasizes 
and points out that the subject elaborated hereunder is topical and widely discussed by 
both practitioners and academics.  There are hard-core restrictions such as price fixing 
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that are still seen as unlawful, but the institutions seem to be willing to cooperate and 
allow the parties to alter their agreements to comply with the competition rules. 
 
When it comes to vertical agreements, it appears from the recent case law of CJEU, 
guidelines enforced by the European Commission and legislation passed within the 
recent years that the EU is not overly strict but rather supportive to economic activity 
and therefore does not conflict with the principles ‘ordoliberal’ market economy.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CMLR     Common Market Law Reports 
E.g.      Exempli gratia (for example) 
CJEU
1
      Court of Justice of the European Union 
ECR     European Court Reports 
ECSC      European Coal and Steel Community 
Ed.     Edition 
EEC     European Economic Community 
Et al.      Et alii (and others) 
Etc.      Et cetera (and so on) 
EU      European Union 
GmbH     Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung 
I.e.      Id est (that is to say) 
Ibid.      Ibidem (same place) 
Ltd.     Limited 
No.     Number  
OJ     Official Journal of the European Union
2
 
p.      Page 
Para.     Paragraph 
pp.     Pages 
SA     Société Anonyme 
TFEU      Treaty on the Functioning of European Union 
UK     United Kingdom 
v.     Versus 
Vol.     Volume 
US     United States 
 
 
 
                                               
1 With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the European Court of Justice  
changed its name to the Court of Justice of the European Union. Reference to the  
CJEU will therefore be given and not to the prior name of the court. 
2  With the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice in 2003, the Official Journal of the European 
Communities changed its name to the Official Journal of the European Union. Both journals are 
abbreviated herein as OJ. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Historical starting points 
 
There are various opinions of why regulating competition is necessary and what the 
importance of competition is. One of the most influential schools for the creation of 
European Union (EU) competition laws came from Germany.
3
 According to the 
Freiburg School of thought, later known as Ordoliberalism
4
, competition is needed for 
the economic freedom of individuals
5
. Furthermore, western countries have proudly 
preserved its capitalistic market economy where, instead of letting the state to take 
over, supply and demand coordinate distribution and costs. Indeed, named approach 
has proven to be vastly beneficial for the growth of the economies. For instance, 
exemplifying the aforesaid success one may examine the economies of post-soviet 
countries whereas during communistic reign their economies were in rags. However, 
after gaining independence and, inter alia, domestically adopting the free market 
principle, these economies started to prosper swiftly - Estonia being the frontrunner
6
. 
Apparently, the market economy leads to a competitive environment, which in turn 
brings along economic efficiency
7
.  
 
Before the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created in 1951, 
Ordoliberal thinkers had introduced a third way in the 30ties, next to the contemporary 
democracy and communism, how the society could work. They offered a solution 
where the market is open and individuals are free to do their business as they wish but 
unlike the classical liberalists, they saw the necessity of regulating competition in order 
to secure individual freedoms against government and other economic entities.
8
  
                                               
3 Jones, A. and Sufrin, B. (2008) EC Competition Law, 3rd ed, p 37, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 
4 Cseres, K. J. (2005) Competition Law and Consumer Protection, p 83, Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Law International 
5Parret, L. (2010), ‘Shouldn't We Know What We are Protecting - Yes We Should - A Plea for a Solid and 
Comprehensive Debate about the Objectives of EU Competition Law and Policy’, p 348, European 
Competition Journal, Vol. 6, No 2, August 2010 , pp 339-376 
6 Rahn, R. W. (2011) ‘Estonia's Free-Market Principles Prevailing’, Newsmax, retrieved from 
http://www.newsmax.com/Rahn/estonia-freemarket-economy/2011/06/21/id/400766 
7Akman, P. (2012) The Concept of abuse in EU competition law - Law and economic approaches, p 25, 
Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing Ltd. 
8 Cseres, K. J. (2005) Competition Law and Consumer Protection, p 83, Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Law International 
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Ordoliberals saw individual economic freedom as a goal in itself and competition was 
supposed to be attained by this. That principle of protecting individual freedom became 
the fundamental objective of Article 65 of the Treaty of Paris, which first dealt with 
agreements and concerted practices that could restrict normal competition in the 
Common Market.
9
 The main things that were tried to protect by this provision were the 
market access and freedom of action
 10
. Indeed, a Nobel-Prize winning economist 
Milton Friedman has also stated, ‘The only way that has ever been discovered to have 
a lot of people cooperate together voluntarily is through the free market. And that's 
why it's so essential to preserving individual freedom.’11  
 
Competition as a stimulus of market efficiency must be protected by fit competition 
law regulations. By taking a legal approach, the aim of competition law is to protect 
competition together with individual economic freedom, whereas from the economic 
perspective the aim of the aforesaid is consumer welfare.
 12
 However, some academics 
say that in practice these aims overlap
13
 - competition results in consumer welfare.  
 
In consumer welfare analysis, the relevance of competition is the prevention of 
increased prices for consumers.
14
 The objectives of competition policies change over 
time and by now, the EU objectives seem to be leaning towards the same attitude as of 
many European sovereign competition authorities. The latter have stipulated in their 
mission statements that the goal of their competition law is ultimately, or even 
                                               
9  ‘All agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices tending directly or indirectly to prevent, restrict or distort normal competition within the 
common market shall be prohibited…’ Art 65 (1), Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community ( 1951), retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:11951K:EN:PDF  
10 Cseres, K. J. (2005) Competition Law and Consumer Protection, p 248, Hague, The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International 
11 Vasigh,B. et al (2008) Introduction to Air Transport Economics: From Theory to Applications, p 29,  
Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, citing Milton Friedeman 
12 Baarsma, B. E. (2011)  ‘Rewriting European Competition Law from an Economic Perspective’,  
European Competition Journal, Vol. 7, No 3, pp 559-585 
13Ibid. 
14 Cseres, K. J. (2005) Competition Law and Consumer Protection, p 20, Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Law International 
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primarily, consumer protection
15
 instead of economic freedom as initially prioritised by 
the founders of the ECSC
16
.   
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) recognized the importance of 
competition when it postulated that the EU competition law principles are considered 
as fundamental principles of law
17
, which are to be eagerly protected within and by this 
Union. The Commission and Courts have successfully interpreted and specified Article 
101 of TFEU that deals with all kinds of agreements between firms, which may be 
harmful towards competition.  
 
1.2. Aim of the study 
 
Therefore, at times it appears that by prohibiting various actions of economic entities 
in order to protect consumer welfare, the EU institutions seem to have neglected why 
they started to protect the efficiency of competition in the first place – as various 
academics have pointed out – the individual economic freedom. Therefore, the author 
of this research makes an attempt to answer to the question whether the EU has 
regulated agreements concluded between market participants too excessively by way 
of legislation and case law and therefore collided with the principle of free economy? 
This paper aims to look into the limits implemented specifically on undertakings that 
are in vertical relationships.  
 
1.3. Structure of the study 
 
In order to answer that, the author firstly explains the meaning of market economy and 
its relation to the competition policies over time. 
 
                                               
15  Baarsma, B. E. (2011)  ‘Rewriting European Competition Law from an Economic Perspective’,  
European Competition Journal, Vol. 7, No 3, pp 559-585 
16 Cseres, K. J. (2005) Competition Law and Consumer Protection, p 248, Hague, The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International 
17Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd, v Benetton International BV, 1 June 1999, [1999] ECR I-
3055 
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Secondly, three forms of vertical agreements and common restrictive clauses, which 
may be prohibited thereunder, are separately focused on. The author chose to 
concentrate on distribution, agency and franchise agreements, taking into consideration 
that these are the most frequently used vertical agreements.
18
 Although online 
distribution is another vertical relationship with great importance, it is not handled 
separately in this research since it can actually occur in every distribution formula, and 
is therefore assessed accordingly. One thing to keep in mind about online distribution, 
though, is that it is regarded as a passive method of sales in competition law context.
19
   
 
Thirdly, the paper disserts the limitations applicable to the restrictions that are outlined 
in the EU legislation and analyses the reasons for such restrictions.  
 
Subsequently, the limitations stemming from the CJEU case law will be explained 
together with the grounds of those rulings. This part will particularly characterise how 
the courts and the Commission have interpreted those limits in the EU legislation.  
 
Finally, the paper ends with an assessment whether the principle of free economy and 
the EU competition regulations are in conflict or not.  
 
1.4. Method of the study 
 
In this research, the author has used law and economics as method of the research 
because competition law closely relates to economics and it is hard to explain 
adequately the occurrences therein without applying economic concepts. In order to 
understand the reasoning and purpose that the legislator wished to achieve with Article 
101 of the TFEU, the author uses analytical-theological method for understanding the 
substance of the principles and limitations deriving from the aforesaid provision. The 
writer has done the analysis via positive approach, describing the situation and trying 
to see the economic impact of EU’s competition law policy on individual economic 
freedom.  
                                               
18 Wijckmans, F. and Tuytschaever, F. (2011) Vertical Agreements in EU Competition Law, Oxford, UK:  
Oxford University Press 
19 Ibid. p 227 
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Thus, first thing to clear out is the essence of market economy.  
 
2. MARKET ECONOMY  
2.1. Definition 
 
Put simply, free market economy is a system where demand and supply dictate 
production. The prices of goods or services are directly dependant on both demand and 
supply.
20
 If nobody wants the item, its price is lowered. If everybody wants it, the price 
gets higher. Nevertheless, the delivery network, which creates vertical relationships, is 
also of essential character, as Andrew Gillespie and many other economists have 
admitted.
 21
 Without distribution, only a very small share of people would receive the 
products, but there is no point in producing goods just to keep these in one’s own 
warehouse. Therefore, it is only logic that a delivery system also affects production. 
Those arguments are based on an assumption that people are rational beings and that 
buyers want to maximise their benefit whereas the producers want to maximise their 
profits.
22
 In a free market economy, it is up to the business owners to decide all aspects 
of the price, production and distribution of the products.
23
 
 
2.2. Features 
 
There are certain basic notions of a truly free economy. Interesting is that usually all of 
these are not pursued at the same time but it is argued that if they were, the economy 
would grow faster than with any other scheme.
24
 First idea is that free economy runs by 
itself and the changes take place organically depending on the demand and supply, not 
by artificially directing the course of it with legislative regulations. In a free market 
economy, it is understood that people themselves are the best deciders what to buy or 
                                               
20 Gillespie, A. (2011) Foundations of Economics, p 114, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Kates, S. (2011) Free Market Economics: An Introduction for the General Reader, p 1, Glos, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 
24 Ibid. p 14 
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produce. They make those decisions based on self-interest. Consequently, firms are 
created by people as the result of their spontaneous will and not by the government as a 
political activity. This is so because people who run firms out of their self-interest are 
prone to make better economic decisions than those who make decisions out of 
political interests. In this system, governments should form laws so that the economic 
activities in private sector are supported. Different techniques have developed for 
economic governing and this is a continuing process described further on. Next, what 
is bought is actually financed by what is sold. In other words, supply finances demand.  
That goes with the next notion that the producers who make things that are paid for, 
actually create money’s value. The main government’s role to maintain this value 
should be not to spend more money than earned by taxes and make sure banks receive 
the money they have lent.  Additionally, businesses instead of governments decide 
what to produce and how to invest its money in a free market economy. By doing so, 
they determine their own necessity and fate in the economy.
25
  
 
2.3. Competition policies and freedom of economy 
 
The above described is a perfect free market system. However, such perfect system 
does not exist. Indeed, ‘[n]o market is or ever has been even remotely laissez-frère.’26 
Every state has put down some rules and barriers by its legislative force, inter alia, to 
preserve competition. The real question thus is how far should the authorities go when 
regulating economic activity?
27
 Through times, the answer to this has taken many 
shapes. Next, the author makes a short historical overview of different competition 
policies in order to understand what influenced the Europe’s response to the 
abovementioned question.  
 
First modern competition laws were introduced as late as 1890 in the United States of 
America.
28
 Sherman Antitrust Act declared illegal all agreements that restrict trade 
                                               
25 Kates, S. (2011) Free Market Economics: An Introduction for the General Reader, pp 14-20, Glos, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 
26 Ibid. p 1 
27 Gillespie, A. (2011) Foundations of Economics, p 115, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 
28 Jones, A. and Sufrin, B. (2008), EC Competition Law, 3rd ed, p 19, Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press 
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among States or with foreign countries.
29
 The reason for the Congress to pass this Act 
was mostly to fight with the growing trend of trusts and cartels in the United States 
(US).
30
 At first, the competition rules introduced in Sherman Act were not enforced 
very strictly; however the Supreme Court gradually expanded their application. For 
example, the Supreme Court ruled that price maintenance clauses in vertical 
agreements are illegal per se not until 1911,
31
 and subsequently confirmed this decision 
in later judgments.
32
 After that came a wave of regulations in the sphere of competition 
policy.
33
 However, the most active anti-trust movement took place from 1940ties until 
70ties,
34
 which was the time when Harvard school of thought had most influence on 
competition policy.
35
  
 
Harvard school introduced the analysis of competition through a paradigm of the 
structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P). It meant that market structure shapes the 
conduct of the firm and that in turn establishes its performance. J.S. Bain, who was one 
of developers of the idea of S-C-P paradigm, found in his empirical studies that the 
structures of the industries were too concentrated and there were high barriers to enter 
into market. These findings led to an extremely interventionist era in the US anti-trust 
policy where extensive amount of economic activities were considered as anti-
competitive.
36
 Indeed, the scholars agree that it was time of increasing complexity and 
formalism in the EU competition laws as well. 
37
 
 
The academics from University of Chicago started to criticize the Harvard standpoints 
in the 1970ties as having several mistakes in their theories. Chicago school stood for 
                                               
29 ’Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1, 
retrieved from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/1  
30 Motta, M. (2004) Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, p 3, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press 
31 U.S. Sup Ct, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), retreived from 
http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/220/373/case.html 
32 Motta, M. (2004) Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, p 4, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press 
33 Ibid. pp 5-7 
34 Ibid. p 7 
35 Jones, A. and Sufrin, B. (2008), EC Competition Law, 3rd ed, p 22, Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press 
36 Ibid. p 22 
37 Gerber, D. J. (2007), Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition Law, p 1239, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol. 31, Issue 5, Art 8  
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the free market without government intervention and that the goal of competition laws 
should only be pursuit of allocative efficiency. Unlike Harvard academics, they did not 
protect small businesses but instead had a view that it does not matter who wins or 
loses, provided that the efficiency is attained.
38
 Although their ideas too were seriously 
criticized, inter alia, for being too simple because they did not accurately show how 
businesses behave in the real world, it nevertheless deeply changed the view on 
competition laws from then on.
39
 This so-called market fundamentalism and the belief 
that an ‘invisible hand’ controls the economic processes were especially propagated by 
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the 80ties,
40
 perhaps thinking what William 
J. Baumol stated in his book: ‘Whatever the deficiencies of the free market, it is 
certainly very good at one thing: the manufacture of economic growth.’41  
 
However, this system is no exception in that it has several failures and imperfections 
when applied in reality.
 42
 Therefore, around mid-1980ties
43
 a so called ‘post-Chicago’ 
school began to improve the ‘pure Chicago’ concepts to a more complex level in order 
to conform to the actual reality. It accepted that the goal of competition is efficiency 
but took into account the difficulties that actually arise when planning the competition 
rules.
44
 For example, when Chicago scholars came to a conclusion that predatory 
pricing is almost never rational in a free market economy then post-Chicago thinkers 
argued that such strategy could be reasonable when one wants to stop rivals to enter 
into the market.
45
 
 
Another example is that in a free market where the fittest win, instead of increasing 
competition the system sometimes creates monopolies.
46
 If a company gets too 
successful, it may become dominant in its relevant market and consequently eat out all 
                                               
38 Jones, A. and Sufrin, B. (2008) EC Competition Law, 3rd ed, p 23, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 
39 Ibid. p 30 
40 Albi, A. (2008), ‘Eesti õigusteadus, globaliseeruv maailm ja äärmusliberaalne majandusideoloogia’, p 
449, Juridica , Vol. VII, 2008, pp. 443-461, ISSN 1406-5495 
41  Baumol, W. J. (2002), The Free Market Innovation Machine: Analyzing the Growth Miracle of 
Capitalism, p. 2, New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press 
42  Gillespie, A. (2002), AS & A Level Economics Through Diagrams, p 23, Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press 
43 Crane, D. A. (2008) Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, a review of How the Chicago School 
Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust edited by Robert 
Pitofsky (2008) Pp xiv, 309, p 1913, The University of Chicago law Review, Vol. 76, Issue 4, Fall 2009  
44 Jones, A. and Sufrin, B. (2008) EC Competition Law, 3rd ed, p 32, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 
45 Ibid. p 30 
46 Ibid. p 23 
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its competitors.
 47
  Monopolised markets, on the other hand, tend to decrease efficiency 
compared to competitive markets.
 48
 This situation can happen, for example, if 
companies make agreements, which essentially prohibit each other to compete on the 
same market or exclude one party from doing business in a certain geographical area. 
For this and other reasons related to general wellbeing of a society, it is necessary for 
the government to intervene in the economy. Indeed, it seems clear in the context of 
economical crises that the market in practice cannot regulate itself. At least not in a 
sustainable manner.
49
  
 
Nevertheless, Chicago school started slowly to penetrate to the EU after the Soviet 
Union collapsed in the beginning of 1990ties when first incentives to modernize the 
EU competition laws emerged. The Commission understood that as new Eastern 
European states would accede to EU, the Directorate-General for competition would 
have a work overload. Therefore, it advocated a modernization procedure by which the 
competition administration was going to be greatly decentralized among the Member 
States’ competition authorities and the whole competition enforcement system would 
be simplified.
50
 In 1999, the EU was at the point where Commission was able to pass a 
white paper on the aforesaid transformation,
51
 and Regulation in 2002
52
 of the same. 
With these procedural changes, also substantive changes took place. In mid-1990ties, 
EU started increasingly to receive criticism on its approach particularly on vertical 
restraints.
53
 To many academics, it became apparent that the form-based approach used 
so far on the assessment of vertical agreements was wrong since it was not dependant 
on the effects of these.
54
 It is argued that around this time, EU slowly started to 
                                               
47 Jones, A. and Sufrin, B. (2008), EC Competition Law, 3rd ed, p 23, Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press. 
48 Ibid. p 92 
49 Albi, A. (2008), ‘Eesti õigusteadus, globaliseeruv maailm ja äärmusliberaalne majandusideoloogia’, p 
456, Juridica, Vol. VII, 2008, pp 443-461, ISSN 1406-5495 
50 Gerber, D. J. (2007) Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition Law, p 1236, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol. 31, Issue 5, Art 8 
51 European Commission White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of 
the EC Treaty (1999) Commission programme No 99/027, COM(1999) 101, retrieved from 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com99_101_en.pdf 
52 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (2002) OJ L 1, retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:001:0001:0025:EN:PDF 
53 Gerber, D. J. (2007) Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition Law, p 1248, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol. 31, Issue 5, Art 8  
54 Ibid. p 1249 
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embrace the viewpoints of neoclassical liberalists and with the latter – the main 
objective of EU competition laws as being the consumer protection.
55
 Guidelines on 
the law of vertical restrains was given out in 1997 and it instructed that the vertical 
agreements shall not be assessed by their form anymore but only by the effects which 
they created in certain conditions.
56
 The Commission’s new approach to the goal of 
competition laws became apparent when similar Guidelines on horizontal agreements 
were produced in 2001.
57
  
 
Next are brought out vertical agreements and the restrictions they often contain that 
may or may not have a bad effect on competition and/or consumer welfare.    
 
3. VERTICAL AGREEMENTS 
3.1. Distribution agreements 
 
Distribution agreements are vertical agreements, which are made between undertakings 
that are on different level of production and distribution chain. Vertical relations and 
agreements clearly have a crucial function in sovereign economies. These agreements 
are the link between manufacturers and retailers and such link is the key element in 
delivering products from the producer to the end-users. It is rather uncommon that a 
manufacturer sells its products to end-customers by itself.
58
 This is where the 
distribution agreements stipulating the terms of the product supplement and 
distribution of the same, concluded between a manufacturer (or any kind of supplier) 
and a wholesaler (or any kind of distributor) come into play.  
 
Surely, there are different forms of distribution agreements - in some, the distributor 
obtains the exclusive right to distribute the supplier’s products and in others, such 
                                               
55 Gerber, D. J. (2007) Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition Law, p 1236, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol. 31, Issue 5, Art 8 
56  EC Communities’ Green Paper on Vertical Restraints (1997), retrieved from 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com96_721_en.pdf 
57 Gerber, D. J. (2007), Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition Law, p 1251, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol. 31, Issue 5, Art 8  
58 Hesselink, M. W. et al. (2006) Principles of European Law: Commercial Agency, Franchise and 
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exclusivity is excluded. The crucial question shall be what the underlying agreement 
stipulates, which is to some extent, as explained later, in the parties’ discretion.  
 
For example, sometimes the parties form an agreement whereby the supplier supplies 
products to a sole distributor who sells these products in a territory specified in the 
agreement, whereas distribution in other territories is prohibited. This concept is 
known as territorial exclusivity.
59
 Alternatively, the distributor agrees to sell products 
to a specified group of customers – known as exclusive customer allocation. The 
distributor usually agrees such terms given that these provide him protection from 
intra-brand competition in concrete segments of buyers.
60
 Indeed, being the only one 
representing some brand in a certain territory or amongst a certain group of customers 
helps a lot to ensure a profitable business.  
 
Furthermore, such protection may be indispensable when trying to enter into a new 
market. In addition, raising the number of competitors in turn enhances competition.
61
 
However, in order to receive such a benefit, the distributor is usually forced to agree to 
purchase only from that supplier (i.e. exclusive purchasing) or at least not to represent 
the competing products. There are also selective distribution contracts where the 
supplier selects its distributors based on qualitative or quantitative criteria. The reason 
for the suppler for setting out such criteria is to maintain a profound image of its 
products through competent and professional distributors. Needless to say, there are 
also types of contracts which are mixtures of all the above mentioned.
62
  
 
Deriving from the aforesaid, there are various so called ‘restrictions’ that the parties 
may have to agree upon in a contract in order to receive certain benefits under the 
agreement. Those are commonly the non-competition and exclusivity clauses, as 
mentioned before. Other examples are price maintenance clauses where the distributor 
is restricted to sell the products within a certain price level determined by the supplier
63
 
                                               
59 Mendelsohn, M. & Rose, S. (2002), International Competition Law Series: Guide to the EC Block 
Exemption for Vertical Agreements, vol. 4,  p 18, Hague, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law International 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Hesselink, M. W. et al. (2006) Principles of European Law: Commercial Agency, Franchise and 
Distribution Contracts, p 261, Oxford, UK: Oxford University press 
63  Hesselink, M. W. et al. (2006) Principles of European Law: Commercial Agency, Franchise and 
Distribution Contracts, p 270, Oxford, UK: Oxford University press 
17 
 
and, for the purposes of this paper, the loyalty discounts. Namely, loyalty discounts 
that are given to the distributor when purchasing the supplier's products are considered 
‘restrictions’ inasmuch as in practice, to receive a favourable price, the distributor is 
obliged to buy all or most of his demand from a sole supplier and that indirectly 
restricts him from purchasing products from other suppliers. If the distributor does not 
buy the amount of products as specified by the supplier, the price may end up 
considerably higher than for others who are loyal to that supplier. Consequently, the 
distributor may end up being attached to that supplier. Having said that, it may be 
concluded that the reason for offering such loyalty discounts is to either bind the 
distributor with the supplier or introduce a de facto exclusivity
64
.
65
 Further examples 
are restriction on the distributor to run sales campaigns or promotions outside the 
agreed territory or even restrictions regards purposes for which the products may be 
sold.
66
  
 
However, all of the abovementioned clauses (i.e. ‘restrictions’) in distribution 
agreements have been more or less held to infringe the EU competition law with 
certain exceptions derived from legislation or court practice. These are explained 
further on. 
 
3.2. Agency agreements 
 
Agency agreements are vertical agreements, which are made between an agent and a 
principal. Whether the agreement really constitutes as an agency agreement under the 
EU law depends on what role the agent has and how much commercial or financial risk 
it assumes in the transactions.
67
 As to the role, an agent is somebody who can negotiate 
the terms of a contract as well as conclude these on the name of the principal in order 
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to sell or purchase goods or services for the principal.
68
 Agency agreements play a 
significant part in the distribution chain in the EU. In practice, it is very common that 
an agent does the marketing of the product and has very little liability for the goods or 
services that were sold. Payment for work comes usually as a commission calculated 
according to agent’s sales. Compared to the distribution contracts explained above, the 
supplier has much more control over the sale of goods or services at issue.
69
 
 
Generally, it can be said that the EU is rather liberal towards agency agreements. The 
reason for this is that the agent is considered only as a supplementary part of the 
principal’s activities because their relationship demands much closer economic ties 
than a distribution relationship.
70
  Similarly to distribution agreements, agency 
contracts often also have various limitations set out in the contract. Again, very 
frequently seen provision is territorial exclusivity, which is explained under the 
distribution agreement paragraph. Another is customer allocation, where either the 
principal or agent is restricted to approach actively certain groups of customers. In 
addition, there are occasions where the principal sets down absolute customer 
restriction on an agent. There are also single branding provisions, which prevent an 
agent to work for other principals and of course, fixed prices and/or non-compete rules. 
71
 According to 1962 Commission Notice on exclusive dealing contracts with 
commercial agents, the abovementioned provisions were not in violation with (what is 
now) Article 101 TFEU, provided that the agent did not have any commercial liability 
in the transactions. Such agency agreements were called as ‘genuine’. 72  However, 
what exactly is considered genuine and what not, was unclear until 2000 Vertical 
Guidelines (now replaced by 2010 Vertical Guidelines) which provided a clarification 
on the matter. Namely, if the agent carries significant risk neither in market-specific 
investments nor in the commercial contracts then it is most likely a genuine agency 
agreement and save for some exceptions, escapes the scrutiny of Article 101 TFEU.
73
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3.3.Franchise agreements 
 
Franchise agreement is also one form of distribution, and it includes transferring 
licences of intellectual property rights relating especially to trademarks or signs as well 
as expertise for the distribution and the use of services or goods. On top of these, the 
franchisor normally provides technical or commercial assistance to the franchisee. 
Transfer of the intellectual property rights is a fundamental part of a franchise.
74
 In 
practice, it means that the franchisee sells products or services under the franchisor’s 
already established business method and advertisement scheme.
75
 Normally, the 
franchisor gets a payment (franchise fee) from the franchisee for using his business 
structure. This approach allows the franchisor to establish a uniform system in order to 
distribute its products.
76
 Common examples of franchises are fast food restaurants, 
hairdressing salons and photocopy shops.
77
 This agreement differs from selective 
distribution agreement because the movement of know-how is essential in this type of 
relationship.
78
  
 
In addition to the business method stipulation, franchise agreements also normally 
contain various vertical restraints related to the products that are distributed. Frequent 
ones are clauses regarding territorial protection or restriction, meaning that sometimes 
the franchisor is by the agreement prohibited to employ other franchisees in a certain 
territory or run any marketing there. Exclusive purchasing and/or supply, where the 
franchisee is prohibited to buy products from other companies other than the franchisor 
or companies it as previously approved.
79
 Common non-competition prohibition means 
that a franchisee cannot do any activities that compete with the franchisor. These 
include, for instance, the prohibition of creating a competitive side business or selling 
goods that compete with those of the franchisor. Such provisions can apply during the 
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contract as well as after termination of it.
80
 Frequent clauses are also quantity forcing 
(prescribing certain quantities of goods the franchisee must buy from the franchisor) 
and customer allocation or restriction (prescribing or prohibiting active sales to certain 
groups of customers)
 
.
81
 
 
Aforesaid shows that all vertical agreements usually have some form of restrictions to 
the parties inset. These may be to protect the intermediary against supplier or against 
other intermediaries (i.e. competitors), or supplier against intermediary. In any case, 
the goal of these provisions is to assure parties so that they can both benefit from the 
agreement. A Nobel-Prize winning economist Milton Friedman has aptly pointed out 
in one of his interviews that ‘the most important single central fact about a free market 
is that no exchange takes place unless both parties benefit.’82 In this interview, he 
defends his argument that black markets are fair and beneficial since the parties are 
free to negotiate their terms of the deal, unlike in the conditions where state authorities 
have forced terms with the means of legislation. In the latter circumstance, he explains, 
it very well may happen that one party gets what he wants whereas the other loses.  
 
EU, however, has taken the approach to regulate agreements and thus given the motive 
to write this research. Those regulations have, as explained in the introduction, 
objectives to protect the parties, competition or the consumers. These rules vary 
between different forms of agreements, as the obligations of the parties do. Next will 
be analyzed what rules the EU has set down regarding vertical agreements.  
 
4. LIMITATIONS IN LEGISLATION 
 
The primary legislation regulating vertical agreements is Article 101(1) of TFEU 
stating that any agreement, which may affect trade between Member States and may 
prevent, restrict or distort competition within the common market, is invalid. In 
particular, the Treaty mentions agreements that fix prices and share markets, which are 
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still often seen as part of vertical agreements. Article 101(3), on the other hand, 
provides justifications for the agreements that have fallen under the scope of Article 
101(1). Namely, all agreements that are beneficial for the economy and consumers, 
whereas not containing unnecessary restrictions on parties and without the possibility 
to eliminate competition in the relevant market, are excused according to Article 
101(3) TFEU, even if per se running contrary to Article 101(1).
83
  
 
Treaty articles are general and often ambiguous in their wording and therefore the EU 
institutions have used their right, as provided for in Articles 103 and 288 of TFEU, to 
introduce secondary legislation, e.g., directives, regulations and guidelines. These help 
to bring the Treaty Articles into force in Member States and provide interpretations, 
specifications, exceptions, etc. necessary to ensure a uniform application of the EU 
competition rules. Some have as their object a consumer protection whereas the others 
are to regulate relations between contractors.
84
 As of now, there are four pieces of 
secondary legislation in EU made precisely to regulate competition in the area of 
vertical agreements. These are the 2001 Notice on agreements of minor importance (de 
minimis Notice), 2010 Regulation 330/2010 on Vertical Agreements
85
, 2010 
Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints and  the 1986 Directive 653 on self-
employed commercial agents.
86
 The author will look at each of these and see what 
limitations have been set to the possible restrictions in vertical agreements by these 
documents.  
4.1. 2001 Notice on agreements of minor importance (de minimis 
Notice) 
 
De minimis doctrine was presented by the Commission in order to reduce the 
uncertainty around the issue of which agreements can escape the prohibitions laid 
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down in Article 101 TFEU. This Notice gives the undertakings relatively free hands to 
form their agreements if the market shares between competitors do not exceed 10% 
and non-competitors 15%. It is said ‘relatively’ free hands because according to the 
Notice, whatever the market share is, independent economic parties should still never 
use hard-core restraints such as price fixing and territorial protection if they want to be 
sure to be in line with effective competition.
87
 The main reason to excuse agreements 
between companies that have very small market shares is that these are not considered 
to affect the internal market. However, going as bold as fixing the prices or allocation 
of markets or customers are generally deemed to restrict competition ‘by their very 
nature’88 and may end up causing a fine and annulment of those clauses from the 
contract. Nevertheless, it is necessary to keep in mind that this, or in fact any other 
Commission’s Notice, are actually not binding. Its purpose is only to contain some 
explanation how the Commission makes its decisions when weighing whether some 
agreement abides EU competition rules or not
89
.  
 
4.2. Regulation 330/2010 on Vertical Agreements 
 
The most important piece of secondary legislation in this field is the Regulation on 
Vertical Agreements, also called as the ‘block exemption regulation’. In principle, it 
excuses all agreements with vertical restrictions if the parties’ total annual turnover 
does not exceed EUR 50 million and the market shares stay under 30% limit of the 
relevant market. It shows that the Commission does not want to intervene in small 
firms’ economical activities since such entities are probably not able to hurt the 
competition on the Union level. Similarly to the Notice, however, it states that in case 
of hard-core restrictions this Regulation does not excuse the agreement, whatever the 
turnover and market shares are, and throws it back under the full scope of Article 101 
of TFEU. In that way, the Commission has shown its limits in which it tolerates 
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restrictions in vertical agreements and seems to show its incentive to protect the 
consumers in case of grave violations.  
 
As to price fixing, it condemns the restriction on distributor to set its own sale price but 
it nevertheless allows the supplier to set a maximum or recommended sale price of the 
product.
90
 Such provision seems to be made in order to protect primarily the 
consumers. In agency agreements, on the other hand, fixing prices is generally allowed 
because the agent and principal are considered to form one single business for the 
purposes of EU competition law. The Guidelines
91
 explain that only in case if the agent 
is an independent intermediary, it must have the right to lower the cost from the 
recommended price by sharing some or all of its commission with the consumer. If an 
independent agent is not allowed to do that then it constitutes a hard-core restriction in 
the meaning of Article 4(a) of Vertical Regulation and loses the benefit of this block 
exemption.
 92
  Here it appears that the Commission has given free hands to do their 
business but intervenes as far as it is possible to offer consumers greater benefits. 
Nevertheless, it has left it up to the agent, i.e. an economic entity, to decide that.  
 
With some exceptions, the Regulation also disapproves restrictions regarding territory 
where the distributor is allowed to sell products. That however shows that the 
Commission is not prohibiting exclusive territorial rights per se.
93
 Such concession 
supports the argument that the Commission is not over-regulating and while protecting 
the competition and consumers, it understands the good impact of some types of 
vertical agreements to economic efficiency. For instance, restrictions in franchising 
agreements are generally allowed because they are assumed to fall under the criteria of 
Article 2(3) of Vertical Regulation,
94
 which in essence exempts restrictions that relate 
to the transfer of intellectual property rights. The Commission therefore does not 
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intervene as long as the parties are merely trying to protect their business secrets. The 
permissibility of some other provisions occurring in franchise agreements depends 
whether that particular franchise agreement is founded on selective or non-selective 
modus operandi. This means whether the franchisee is allowed or not to sell products 
to unauthorized distributors. In case of selectivity, selective distribution rules apply. In 
case of non-selective method, exclusive or non-exclusive distribution rules apply. 
95
   
 
In selective distribution agreements, the Commission has limited the scope of the block 
exemption to agreements, which do not restrict retailers’ right to sell products to end 
users and agreements that do not restrict cross-supplies between distributors. However, 
agreements including provisions that restrict the manufacturer to supply its products to 
end users are considered not to find a protection from the block exemption regulation.
96
  
 
Regards non-compete clauses in vertical agreements; the Commission has taken a more 
relaxed view in that it allows such clauses to exist for five years. Should it be inserted 
or left in the agreement for a longer period than that, it can simply be ordered to be 
taken out of it whereas the rest could still stay under the scope of block exception 
Regulation.  
 
The same goes to restrictions on the distributor to purchase, manufacture, sell or resell 
goods or services after termination of the agreement. However, such a restriction can 
only be applied for one year and only regards competing products with the contract 
goods on the same premises as during the contract and only when it is necessary to 
protect the knowledge given from the supplier to distributor. All four of these 
conditions have to be met in order to be in accordance with the block exemption
97
. For 
example, these conditions are often met in franchise agreements.
98
  
 
It shows that the Commission is not categorically condemning all non-compete clauses 
in agreements but is having rather flexible view in this respect. It allows, in principle, 
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the parties to restrict each other, but it has set certain limits and rules on these 
restrictions in order to protect the parties themselves and ultimately, the consumers.  
 
4.3. 2010 Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints 
 
Vertical Guidelines is a non-binding document accompanying Regulation on vertical 
agreements. Its purpose is to clarify on what conditions the Regulation is applied 
exactly, wherein it provides explicit principles how to define the relevant market as 
well as how to calculate market shares. It also sheds some light on the question how 
the Commission analyses the facts of the cases before it and defines more thoroughly 
those vertical agreements that do not fall under scrutiny of Article 101 of TFEU. 
99
 
These Guidelines, like the Notice, are simply to provide detailed explanations, which 
allow undertakings to better understand EU legislation and act in accordance to it. 
Accordingly, the principle of legal certainty seems to be satisfied.  
 
Vertical Guidelines come in especially handy when it is necessary to assess whether 
certain provisions in agency agreements fall under the scope of Article 101 TFEU. For 
instance, it clarifies that single branding, exclusive purchasing as well as post-term 
non-competition provisions do fall under Article 101 TFEU, no matter whether the 
agent is independent or not. If these provisions play a part in creating restrictive effects 
on entering into market, they may infringe Article 101.
100
  
 
On the one hand, it indicates that the Commission is leaving too little economic 
freedom to the parties. It is willing to enter into an economic relationship and regulate 
it even if the parties to an agreement are not independent bodies, keeping an eye on the 
fact that the agent is normally considered to form a part of the principal.
101
 On the 
other hand, the objective here is to protect the smooth entering into market, and in 
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effect economical freedom, instead of consumer protection. That, however, is in 
accordance with the principles of the initial objectives of the EU.  
 
As to franchising, the Guidelines indicate that the agreement has to be categorized as 
either exclusive, non-exclusive, selective or non-selective, and assessed accordingly 
under the Regulation.
102
  
 
4.4. 1986 Directive 653 on self-employed commercial agents 
 
This Directive defines the idea of self-employed commercial agents and provides some 
insight what are the obligations and rights of the parties to an agency agreement. The 
aim of this Directive was to protect the agents’ freedom of establishment,103 which 
conforms to the views of ordoliberians. 
 
For one intervention into vertical agreements, it can be brought out that Article 20 
renders invalid all restraints that last after the agency agreement has ended, unless they 
last less than two years and apply only to the customers, areas or goods that were 
covered by the contract. However, this is a minimum requirement and the Member 
States can always make their laws stricter on that matter. 
104
 
 
Based on the above it can be argued that in general, the Commission has regulated the 
area of vertical agreements rather thoroughly but nevertheless so that providing the 
parties to an agreement flexibility to agree on certain restrictions without harming each 
other, competition or consumers. Furthermore, the Commission has brought out certain 
vertical agreements, such as agency and subcontracting agreements, which generally 
do not fall under Article 101 TFEU.
105
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Next step in the analysis is to look at how these rules have been applied in real life 
situations, i.e. how the case law has employed those rules. 
 
5. LIMITATIONS IN CASE LAW – INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGISLATION 
 
Firstly, it is important to know that the limits on agreements set out in the Treaty itself 
are directly applicable. As early as in Bosch
106
 case CJEU introduced a  rule that 
Article (which is now) 101 in TFEU is directly applicable and ready to be relied upon 
in a national court by one undertaking against another. In the light of the aforesaid 
ruling, those limits are not some vague rules but very concrete and obligatory. 
However, to avoid legal consequences for unlawful restrictions set out in the Treaty, 
there is a possibility to be ‘excused’, either individually or by a category. Since 1962, 
the Commission had sole right to grant such exemptions but this monopoly was 
eliminated with the modernization of competition rules in 2004.
107
 Since then, the view 
on unlawful agreements have loosened somewhat and the consumer welfare started to 
be increasingly important. In general, it can be said that CJEU has been more hesitant 
than the Commission to rule that distribution agreements are anti-competitive.
108
 
 
As to agency agreements, on the other hand, it seems that the Court is slowly 
becoming more restrictive.
109
 In 1966, it ruled in Consten and Grundig that agency 
agreements do not fall under (what is now) Article 101(1) of TFEU. It confirmed this 
idea in Sugar case, maintaining that because the agent is not an independent body but 
rather considered as part of the principal, then even a non-compete restriction in the 
agreement does not fall under Article 101. In Volkswagen, however, the court assessed 
whether the agent carries any risks in the transactions and found that if so then the 
agent is on the same footing with independent distributors.
110
 In these circumstances, 
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the restrictive clauses even in an agency agreement may fall under Article 101 of 
TFEU
111
.
112
 Furthermore, the Court ruled that agency agreements, which end up 
restricting competition between agents, might also come under scrutiny of Article 101 
of TFEU.
113
 
 
In general, there are four different types of analyses in EU competition infringement. 
One is looking at the objective of the agreement and whether it is expected to infringe 
Article 101 of TFEU. In Miller case, the CJEU held that proof of the actual impact on 
trade is not necessary, if it was capable of having potential or indirect effects on 
trade.
114
 Second type of analysis is to look directly at the effect of the agreement. If it 
is claimed to restrict competition then it is up to defendant to prove that the restriction 
is justified under 101(3) of TFEU. In addition, there are agreements that fall under the 
abovementioned block exemption Regulation. The Regulation has rather stringent 
conditions but if these are met, the agreement is considered to be in a so-called ‘safe 
harbour’ and is exempted from the scrutiny of Art 101(1) of TFEU. And finally, there 
is a form of analysis to see if the agreements are simply insignificant, that is, their 
effect on competition is too small to take into account.
115
 Before the Commission 
issued de minimis Notice, the CJEU had already found in Völk v Vervaecke that even if 
there is an absolute territorial protection but it does not affect trade or restrict 
competition then it does not fall under Article 101(1).
116
 
 
Likewise to the ‘hardcore restrictions’ in Commission’s legislation, the case law has 
shown that some restraints in agreements have an objective to restrict competition and 
are thus unlawful, regardless of their actual effect at that time.  
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In European Night Services it was clearly held that agreements to fix prices between 
competitors, share markets or limit output were unlawful.
117
 However, vertical 
agreements are seen less harmful than horizontal ones in that respect, as the parties 
operate on different levels and usually do not compete with each other. Nevertheless, 
this ruling applies just as well to vertical agreements, should the parties be competing 
in some areas.
118
 
 
Vertical agreements that include clauses, which impose fixed or minimum resale prices 
on a distributor (resale price maintenance) was held to be a grave violation of 
competition laws by a preliminary ruling in SA Binon & Cie. 
119
 This was also held to 
infringe competition laws by the Commission in Deutsche Philips case, and 
consequently resulted in a fine.
120
 However, the supplier in a vertical relationship is 
allowed to set a maximum or recommended sale price of the product. In any case, 
going beyond than just recommending minimum price is taken as a weighty breach of 
competition.
121
 
 
Vertical restrictions that bring about exclusive sales territory and/or protection from 
sales by others within that territory or which otherwise restrict parallel trade was also 
condemned in GlaxoSmithKline.
 122
 Export bans, which prohibit a distributor from 
exporting the product outside a designated area were in the 70ies said to be judged 
particularly severely, as was any other attempt to establish absolute territorial 
protection for a distributor.
123
 However, ten years later the CJEU ruled that in certain 
circumstances, where absolute territorial protection is necessary for the success of a 
distribution system, such restriction might fall out of Article 101(1) of TFEU. 
124
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Although, in Pronuptia it ruled that a franchise agreement creating territorial 
exclusivity was covered by Article 101 of TFEU but also that it could be  exempted 
under Article 101(3).
125
 
Generally, it appears that both the Court and Commission are prone to allow territorial 
exclusivity in franchise agreements because it is seen as very beneficial for small 
companies.
126
  
 
Sometimes it is not evident from the objective of the exclusive distribution agreement 
whether it has as its object to restrict competition. In that case, the courts look at the 
effects of it. That requires a market analysis: to see the agreement in its legal, factual 
and economic context.
127
 CJEU used the same line of analysis in Delimitis, regarding 
an exclusive purchasing agreement.
128
 Generally, the case law shows that if an 
exclusive supply contract helps to penetrate some market then it is to be encouraged.
129
 
 
As to selective distribution agreements, both the CJEU and Commission agree that if 
the distributors are chosen uniformly and non-discriminatorily by an objective 
qualitative criterion based on technical qualifications of the distributor and the 
suitability of his trading premises then it escapes the application of Article 101(1).
130
 In 
addition, goods where brand image is important
131
 or products that require specialist 
staff can justify selective distribution agreements.
132
 However, the limit of this 
compromise is where such selective distribution agreement starts to eliminate 
competition
133
 or award absolute territorial protection.
134
 Commission’s flexibility is 
apparent when it approved B&W Loudspeakers' selective distribution agreement, if the 
company removed its hard-core restrictions from it.
135
 Similarly, the Commission 
accepted the agreement of Yves Saint Laurent, subject to letting its distributors to sell 
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perfumes and other luxury items in Internet.
136
 In Yves Rocher
137
 and Computerland
138
 
decisions, the Commission approved a selective franchise system because understood 
that only this way the franchisor could maintain its reputation. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
When EU predecessor ECSC was created in 1951, the founding fathers had in mind to 
regulate competition in order to encourage market integration and protect economic 
freedom. According to many academics, and as apparent from the legislation and case 
law, the EU has changed its competition enforcement policies in the course of time. It 
is pointed out that the objective of protecting economic freedom has largely switched 
to the protection of consumers. Whether this changed objective has led to over-
regulation of the area of vertical agreements, and by limiting the freedom of 
contractors in those agreements, has the EU eventually run contrary to the principle of 
the founding fathers’ view on regulating the market economy was the basis of this 
paper. Taking into consideration all of the above mentioned, the author is inclined to 
believe that this is not the case.  
 
Although EU started with the ordoliberal objective of regulating competition to protect 
economic freedom, it has had a lot of influence from the US on that matter. One could 
see from the case law that up until the 1980ties, EU had a rather strict approach when 
assessing whether certain conducts are anti-competitive or not. At the same time across 
the ocean, the Harvard school of thought had its highest peak, which was noticeable by 
an extremely interventionist era in US. However, when more liberal Chicago and post-
Chicago schools replaced the Harvard way of thinking, seeing the objective of 
competition to ensure effectiveness, the EU appeared to have gradually changed its 
policy as well.  For example, attempts to establish absolute territorial protection for a 
distributor were in the 1970ies judged particularly severely, as exemplified in Miller 
International Schallplatten. However, in 1984 the CJEU ruled in Pronuptia that where 
absolute territorial protection is necessary for the success of a distribution system, such 
restriction could be justified under Article 101(3) of TFEU and in Erauw-Jacquéry that 
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they may even fall out of 101 TFEU. Indeed, after the modernization it was clear that 
EU has added a new objective regarding competition policy, which is consumer 
protection. 
 
While consumer protection may raise suspicions especially from entrepreneurs whether 
their economic freedoms will be restricted, it is interesting to notice that EU 
competition policy has actually liberalized. The Commission understands that vertical 
agreements may have positive effects and has also stipulated these in the 2010 Vertical 
Guidelines. Luckily, together with the modernization of EU competition procedures 
the Commission also ‘modernized’ its formalistic approach to a more effects-based 
approach regarding competition enforcement. This in turn helps to excuse many 
vertical restraints, which in essence do not have damaging effect on competition but 
would earlier be prohibited simply by their form. For instance, shift in attitude was in 
addition to the abovementioned seen also in 1987 in the Commission’s Yves Rocher 
and Computerland decisions where it approved selective franchise systems because it 
understood that only this way the franchisor could maintain its reputation.  
 
Overall, it can be seen from the case law on vertical agreements that the Courts’ and 
Commission’s formalistic and strict approach is shifting towards an economic-based 
approach. It seems that as time goes by, the Courts and Commission become more 
flexible and do not rule all restrictions absolutely unlawful but analyse these in their 
economic and legal context, and offer parties to remove hard-core restrictions or 
otherwise alter their agreement so that it would eventually be in line with EU 
competition rules. However, this shows that as regards to vertical agreements, the EU 
has not overly regulated our freedom of contracting and therefore has not run contrary 
to the competition principles of the ‘founding fathers’, but instead just added another 
one – the consumer protection.  
 
 
 
 
33 
 
LIST OF REFERECES 
 
Books and Independent Publications 
 
1. Akman, P. (2012) The Concept of abuse in EU competition law - Law and 
economic approaches, Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing Ltd. 
2. Baumol, W. J. (2002), The Free Market Innovation Machine: Analyzing the 
Growth Miracle of Capitalism, New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press 
3. Cseres, K. J. (2005) Competition Law and Consumer Protection, Hague, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International 
4. Gillespie, A. (2011) Foundations of Economics, Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press 
5. Goyder, J. (2005) EU Distribution Law, 4th ed, Oregon, USA: Hart Publishing 
6. Hesselink, M. W. et al. (2006) Principles of European Law: Commercial 
Agency, Franchise and Distribution Contracts, Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University press 
7. Jones, A. and Sufrin, B. (2008) EC Competition Law, 3rd ed, Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press 
8. Kates, S. (2011) Free Market Economics: An Introduction for the General 
Reader, Glos, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 
9. Korah, V. and O’Sullivan, D.(2002) Distribution Agreements Under the EC 
Competition Rules, Oregon, USA: Hart Publishing 
10. Lidgard, H.H. (2011), Part I: Competition Classics. Material & cases on 
European Competition Law and Practice, Lund, Sweden: Maria Magle 
Publishing 
11. Mendelsohn, M. & Rose, S. (2002), International Competition Law Series: 
Guide to the EC Block Exemption for Vertical Agreements, vol. 4,  Hague, the 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International 
12. Motta, M. (2004) Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press 
13. Ritter, L. and Braun W.D. (2005) European Competition Law: A 
Practitioner’s Guide, Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International 
34 
 
14. Vasigh,B. et al. (2008) Introduction to Air Transport Economics: From Theory 
to Applications, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, citing Milton 
Friedeman 
15. Wijckmans, F. and Tuytschaever, F. (2011) Vertical Agreements in EU 
Competition Law, Oxford, UK:  Oxford University Press 
 
Articles 
 
16. Albi, A. (2008), ‘Eesti õigusteadus, globaliseeruv maailm ja äärmusliberaalne 
majandusideoloogia’, Juridica , Vol. VII, 2008, pp. 443-461, ISSN 1406-5495 
17. Baarsma, B. E. (2011)  ‘Rewriting European Competition Law from an 
Economic Perspective’,  European Competition Journal, Vol. 7, No 3, pp 559-
585 
18. Crane, D. A. (2008) Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, a review of 
How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative 
Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust edited by Robert Pitofsky (2008) Pp xiv, 
309, The University of Chicago law Review, Vol. 76, Issue 4, Fall 2009  
19. Gerber, D. J. (2007), Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition 
Law, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31, Issue 5, Art 8  
20. Parret, L. (2010), ‘Shouldn't We Know What We are Protecting - Yes We 
Should - A Plea for a Solid and Comprehensive Debate about the Objectives of 
EU Competition Law and Policy’, European Competition Journal, Vol. 6, No 
2, August 2010 , pp 339-376 
21. Rahn, R. W. (2011) ‘Estonia's Free-Market Principles Prevailing’, Newsmax, 
retrieved from http://www.newsmax.com/Rahn/estonia-freemarket-
economy/2011/06/21/id/400766 
 
Other sources 
 
22. European Commission’s Green Paper on Vertical Restraints (1997), retrieved 
from http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com96_721_en.pdf 
23. European Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010), OJ C 130, 
retrieved from http://eur-
35 
 
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:130:0001:0046:EN:
PDF 
24. European Commission’s Notice on agreements of minor importance which do 
not appreciably restrictcompetition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community  (2001) OJ C 368, retrieved from 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2001:368:0013:0015:EN:
PDF   
25. European Commission’s White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules 
Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (1999) Commission 
programme No 99/027, COM(1999) 101, retrieved from 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com99_101_en.pdf 
26. Friedman, M. (2000), interview, ‘The Economic Logic Behind Black Markets’, 
retrieved from 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/int_miltonfried
man.html#2   
 
Table of cases 
 
27. Case 161/84 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard 
Schillgalis [1986] ECR 353 
28. Case 311/85 ASBL Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v. ASBL Sociale 
Dienst van de Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten [1987] ECR 
3801 
29. Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European 
Communities [1979] ECR 461, retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61976CJ0085:EN:PDF 
30. Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd, v Benetton International BV [1999] 
ECR I-3055 
31. Case C-13/61 Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v Robert Bosch 
GmbH and Maatschappij tot voortzetting van de zaken der Firma Willem van 
Rijn [1962], ECR 45, [1962] CMLR 1 
36 
 
32. Case C-19/77 Miller International Schallplatten GmbH v Commission of the 
European Communities [1978] ECR 131 
33. Case C-217/05 Confederación Espanola de. Empresarios de Estaciones de 
Servicio v CEPSA [2006] ECR I-11987 
34. Case C-23/67 Brasserie De Haecht v Wilkin [1967] ECR 407 
35. Case C-234/83 SA Binon&Cie v SA Agence et Messageries de la Presse [1985] 
ECR 2015 
36. Case C-234/89 StergiosDelimitis v HenningerBraü [1991] ECR I-935 
37. Case C-26/76 Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH v Commission [1977] ECR 1875 
38. Case C-266/93 Bundeskartellamt v Volkswagen AG and VAG Leasing, [1995] 
ECR  I-3477 
39. Case C-27/87 Erauw-Jacquéry v La Hesbignonne [1988] ECR 1919 
40. Case C-5/69 Franz Völk v Établissements J. Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295 
41. Case C-56/65 Societe Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1966] 
ECR 235 
42. Case C-70/93 BayerischeMotorenwerke AG v. ALD Auto-Leasing D GmbH 
[1995] ECR 3439 
43. Case C-75/84 Metro v Commission II [1986] ECR 3021 
44. Commission decision 36533 - Yves Saint Laurent  [2001] 
45. Commission decision 37709 - B&W Loudspeakers  [2002] 
46. Commission decision 73/322/EEC Deutsche Philips GmbH [1973] OJ L 
293/40, case IV/27.010 
47. Commission decision 84/233/EEC IBM personal computers [1984] OJ L 118, 
case IV/30.849 
48. Commission decision 85/616/EEC Villeroy&Boch [1985] OJ L 376/15, case 
IV/30.665 
49. Commission decision 87/14/EEC Yves Rocher [1987] OJ L8/49, case 
IV/31.428 to 31.432 
50. Commission decision 87/407/EEC Computerland [1987] OJ L222/12, case 
IV/32.034 
51. Joined cases C-501/06 P, etc. GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited and others 
v Commission of the European Communities [2009], retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62006J0501:EN:HTM
L 
37 
 
52. Joined cases T-374, 375, 384 and 388/94 European Night Services v 
Commission [1998] ECR II-3141 
53. U.S. Sup Ct, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 
[1911], retreived from 
http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/220/373/case.html 
 
Table of legislative acts 
 
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1, retrieved from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/1  
55. Commission Regulation No 330/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical 
agreements and concerted practices (2010) OJ L 102, retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:102:0001:0007:EN:
PDF 
56. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(2010) OJ C 83, retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:P
DF 
57. Council Directive 86/653/EEC on the coordination of the laws of the Member 
States relating to self-employed commercial agents (1986) OJ L 382, recieved 
from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1986:382:0017:0021:EN:
PDF 
58. Council Regulation No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (2002) OJ L 1, 
retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:001:0001:0025:EN:
PDF 
59. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), retrieved 
from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:11951K:EN:PDF 
 
 
